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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RAYMOND MICHAEL QUINTANA, : Case No. 20030471-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for: (1) burglary, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-202 (Supp. 2003); and, (2) theft, a class 
B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-404 (1999). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), which 
grants this Court jurisdiction over cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Before admitting expert testimony, trial courts must determine that the 
testimony is reliable and will, therefore, assist the jury in determining guilt or innocence. 
The trial judge admitted expert testimony on latent fingerprints even though no studies or 
research have established the reliability, validity, or accuracy of fingerprint identification. 
Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in admitting an expert's subjective belief that the 
latent fingerprint matched Mr. Quintana's fingerprints? 
This Court reviews the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Schultz. 2002 UT App 366, ^21, 58 P.3d 879. Defense counsel requested the 
trial judge to exclude the expert testimony and sought a directed verdict based on the 
unreliability of fingerprint evidence. R. 178: 144-52, 170-75.] 
2. When a case is based solely on circumstantial evidence, the State must present 
evidence supporting each element of an offense and establish a reasonable basis that the 
defendant committed an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The only evidence 
associating Appellant Raymond Michael Quintana with a burglary and theft was a latent 
fingerprint found on a box that had been kept in a bedroom drawer for 30 years and from 
which valuables had been taken. Did the latent fingerprint establish proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or did it give rise only to remote or speculative possibilities of guilt? 
In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court defers to the jury verdict and 
will only reverse a conviction when reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Hawkins. 967 P.2d 966, 971 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Appellant preserved this issue by requesting the trial judge for a 
directed verdict based on the lack of evidence. R. 178: 170-71. 
3. Trial judges must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense if a rational 
!The volume marked 178 contains the trial transcript. The internal page numbers 
of that volume will be referred to as "R. 178:" followed by the page number. 
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basis exists for acquitting the defendant of the greater offense and convicting on the 
lesser crime. Mr. Quintana asserted that because the only evidence supporting the case 
was a latent fingerprint that could have been deposited at any time, he requested the trial 
judge to instruct the jury on the lesser crime of trespass. Did the trial judge err in 
concluding that this theory was so remote that it did not warrant a lesser included offense 
instruction? 
Whether the trial judge should have instructed the jury on a lesser related offense 
is a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. Payne, 964 P.2d 
327, 332 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Trial counsel requested the trial judge to give such an 
instruction. R. 178: 176-77. 
COURT RULE 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 details when parties may offer expert testimony: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-206 defines a criminal trespass in relevant part: 
(1) For purposes of this section, "enter" means intrusion of the 
entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 or a violation of Section 76-
10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism: 
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(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or 
damage to any property, including the use of graffiti as defined 
in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the 
safety of another. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 7, 2002, the State charged Mr. Quintana with one count of burglary 
and one count of theft. R. 3. The case proceeded to a jury trial on April 3, 2003, where a 
jury convicted Mr. Quintana of both counts. R. 151-52; 178: 218. The trial judge held a 
joint sentencing hearing with two other charges to which Mr. Quintana had pleaded 
guilty. R. 158. On May 12, 2003, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Quintana to a term of 
one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to 
the sentences on the other two convictions. R. 158-59; Addendum. Mr. Quintana filed a 
notice of appeal on May 30, 2003. R. 164. He remains incarcerated pending this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Virginia Cannon lives with her husband in their home at 2250 East 1700 South in 
Salt Lake City. R. 178: 76. On Sunday, October 20, 2002, Ms. Cannon and her husband 
left their home at about 12:45 p.m. to attend church. Id_ at 77-78. As the couple left, 
they shut and locked the front door. Id. at 78. 
The Cannons returned to their home at 2:15 p.m. IdL. at 79. As she approached the 
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front door, Ms. Cannon saw a paper sticking out from under the front door. IcL The 
paper had been in Ms. Cannon's bedroom before she had left for church. IdL When she 
tried to open the front door, Ms. Cannon noticed that the door handle had been crushed 
and would spin without opening the door. IcL 
Ms. Cannon pushed the door open and saw her house in disarray. Id. at 81. 
Drawers had been pulled out, their contents had been scattered, closet doors were 
removed from their hinges, and both of the Cannons' computer terminals had been 
moved. Id, at 81-85. Ms. Cannon saw a similar scene in her bedroom and noticed that 
some of her jewelry was missing. Id. at 82. 
Ms. Cannon also observed that a small wooden box had been removed from her 
husband's chest of drawers. IdL at 86. The box was missing approximately $30 in cash 
that Mr. Cannon had stored there. IcL at 88. The Cannons obtained the box 30 years 
previously and had kept the box in the chest of drawers during that entire period. IcL_ at 
95-96. Because the box remained in the drawer during this period, Ms. Cannon believed 
that no one had touched the box prior to the home invasion. IcL 
The police responded to the Cannons' home to investigate the crime. IcL at 99. A 
police officer checked the entire home for latent fingerprints. IdL at 124. The officer 
found several smudged prints but could not lift any of them, including those on the door 
handles and computer terminals. IdL at 109-10. The police did locate a single latent 
fingerprint on the box that had been removed from Mr. Cannon's chest of drawers. IcL_ at 
5 
127. Police technician Karen Kido compared Mr. Quintana's fingerprints to the latent 
print found on the box and concluded that the latent print matched Mr. Quintana's right 
middle finger. Id. at 159. 
The State charged Mr. Quintana with burglary and theft. R. 3. The case 
proceeded to a jury trial where Officer Kido detailed her experience in fingerprints. R. 
178: 135. She had taken courses in latent fingerprint analysis with the Utah State Crime 
Lab, the American Institute of Applied Sciences ("ALAS"), and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation ("FBI"). Id^ at 135. She also trained other police officers in fingerprint 
collection and analysis and had eight years of experience in fingerprinting with the Salt 
Lake City Police Department ("SLCPD"). IdL at 134-35. The AIAS, and the 
International Association of Identification ("LAI") had also recognized her as qualified in 
fingerprint analysis. LI at 135. Although Officer Kido had taken some college courses, 
she had received no degrees from any institution of higher learning. Id. at 140. 
Officer Kido described the process for comparing fingerprints. IcL at 135-38. She 
asserted that fingerprints were unique for every living person. Id. at 138. She claimed 
further that fingerprints do not change from birth until death and that the prints on each 
person's fingers differ from one another. Id. 
Defense counsel interrupted the prosecutor's examination of Officer Kido and 
received permission to question her about her expertise. Id. at 139-40. Defense counsel 
elicited that Officer Kido knew of no database establishing that fingerprints are unique to 
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each individual. Id. at 141. Officer Kido added, though, that no two fingerprints have 
ever been shown to be alike and that even identical twins have different fingerprints. IdL_ 
Officer Kido knew of no error rates for fingerprint examiners who match latent 
prints to a person's full set of all ten inked fingerprints. Id. at 142. Nor did Officer Kido 
know of any probability analyses on the likelihood of falsely matching fingerprints. Id. 
at 141. Although SLCPD requires a minimum of 10 matching points to support a match, 
Officer Kido testified that no organization, including the AIAS or the LAI, had 
established any "scientific basis for having a certain amount of points for identification." 
Id. at 140. Rather, the SLCPD relies on a second examiner to verify identifications. Id. 
at 142-43. 
Following this inquiry, defense counsel requested the trial judge to exclude 
Officer Kido's testimony. Ici at 144. Defense counsel argued that the lack of scientific 
research, known error rates, or industry standards rendered the matching of latent 
fingerprints a subjective endeavor that was inherently unreliable. Id, at 144-49. Citing 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), State v. Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), and Utah Rule of Evidence 702, defense counsel argued that 
Officer Kido's proposed testimony should be excluded. 
The prosecutor admitted that no data base proved that fingerprints were unique to 
each individual and that no one standard existed for matching fingerprints. R. 178: 149-
50. Nevertheless, the prosecutor argued that courts had used fingerprint evidence for 
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many years, no one had disproved the theories behind this evidence, and no error rates 
existed because she did know of a single case of misidentification when "the analysis is 
done correctly." Id. The trial judge denied the defense motion and summarily ruled that 
fingerprint evidence "is scientifically acceptable and has been for many years in courts of 
law." Id at 152. 
Officer Kido then testified that the latent fingerprint found on Mr. Cannon's box 
matched Mr. Quintana. IcL at 159. The State presented no other evidence connecting 
Mr. Quintana to the crime nor did it show that he had ever been in or even near the 
Cannons' home. 
On cross-examination, Officer Kido admitted that a West Valley Police Officer 
named, Scott Spjut, had recently mistakenly identified a crime victim's fingerprints as the 
defendant's. Id. at 167. Officer Kido reluctantly admitted that human error occurs in 
matching fingerprints but she did not know of any error rates. Id. at 167-69. She 
explained, however, that Officer Spjut's misidentification resulted from a clerical error. 
Id. at 168. Finally, Officer Kido testified that she did not compare the latent fingerprint 
in this case to Christopher Wayne Pyle's, who police had recently arrested for suspecting 
that he had committed over 300 burglaries in the Salt Lake area. IJL at 169. 
Following Officer Kido's testimony, the State rested. IcL at 170. Defense counsel 
then requested a directed verdict because the only evidence supporting the charges was 
the latent fingerprint found on Mr. Cannon's box. IcL at 170-71. Defense counsel also 
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reiterated his concerns about the lack of error rates for fingerprint identifications. Id_ at 
171-72. Again, the trial judge denied the motion because fingerprint evidence had been 
used for decades in courts. Id. at 175. 
Defense counsel then requested the trial judge for a lesser included offense 
instruction on criminal trespass because the State presented no evidence that Mr. 
Quintana had taken anything. Id. at 176-77. Further, the fingerprint evidence merely 
showed that Mr. Quintana had entered the Cannons' home at some unspecified time and 
that others may have ransacked the house and taken the money and jewelry. Id_ at 177-
78. The trial judge denied the request even though he stated that it was "remotely 
possible" that Mr. Quintana entered the home separately from the actual burglars. Id. at 
179. He concluded that this possibility was "so remote and such a long shot" that it did 
not warrant instructing the jury. Id. 
The jury convicted Mr. Quintana of burglary and theft. R. 178: 218. The trial 
judge sentenced Mr. Quintana to a term of one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison and 
ordered the sentence to run consecutive to sentences in two other cases. R. 158-59; 
Addendum. This appeal followed. R. 164. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although Utah law is not clear on the standard for determining the admissibility 
of fingerprint evidence, at the very least, the proponent of this evidence must establish 
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that the proposed testimony is based on reliable principles. Fingerprint evidence fails to 
satisfy this requirement because no research or testing has ever proven the main premise 
underlying fingerprints, that each individual has a unique set of fingerprints. Further, no 
evidence supports that fingerprint examiners can reliably identify latent fingerprints. The 
absence of testing, error rates, standards for identification, and peer review of fingerprint 
evidence all undermine the validity of fingerprint identification. Contrary to commonly-
held notions, identifying fingerprints is an inherently subjective process that is subject to 
error and dishonesty. Although fingerprints have been generally accepted for the past 
100 years, the absence of research on the validity of fingerprint evidence eliminates 
relying on this long history to justify its admission. The faulty assumptions underlying 
fingerprint evidence render that evidence unreliable. 
Even if fingerprint evidence were valid, the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence to convict Mr. Quintana of burglary and theft. The only evidence implicating 
Mr. Quintana in the crimes was the fingerprint on Mr. Cannon's box. Because the State 
presented no evidence of when the fingerprint was deposited, there was no evidence that 
Mr. Quintana had taken anything, and the State could not narrow the placement of the 
fingerprint to a period other than a 30-year span, the evidence did not support the 
convictions. Rather, only speculative possibilities exist of a crime. 
The trial judge also erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offense of criminal trespass. Criminal defendants are entitled to instruct jurors on lesser 
10 
offenses when even slight evidence supports acquittal of the greater charge and 
conviction on the lesser offense. The evidence below supported Mr. Quintana's theory 
that the fingerprint could have been placed on the box on a separate occasion from the 
burglary and without any intent to commit a theft or a felony. Because the trial judge 
misunderstood the law on on lesser offenses, the judge prejudiced the defense. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial judge erred in several respects, all of which resulted in Mr. Quintana 
being erroneously convicted. First, because the State failed to establish the reliability of 
the fingerprint evidence, the trial judge should not have admitted this evidence which 
constituted the only evidence of guilt. Second, even if the trial judge properly admitted 
the fingerprint evidence, the existence of a lone latent fingerprint that could have been 
left anytime during a 30-year period did not support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Third, the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of 
criminal trespass. Because, absent each of these errors, the jury would not have 
convicted Mr. Quintana, reversal is warranted. 
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I. THE FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE WAS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE THE STATE COULD NOT 
SHOW ITS RELIABILITY OR VALIDITY. 
The trial judge abused his discretion in admitting expert testimony on fingerprints 
without establishing the reliability of the premises underlying fingerprints or the 
procedures used to identify latent prints. No research supports the commonly-held belief 
that fingerprints are permanent, unique, and cannot be confused with other persons5 
fingerprints. In fact, the process of matching a latent fingerprint with a person's full 
fingerprints involves no proven standards and is highly subjective. Because there is no 
support for the reliability of fingerprint evidence, the trial court should have excluded the 
expert's testimony below. At the very least, the State failed to establish that the 
testimony in this case was reliable. 
A. Utah Law Requires the Proponent of Expert 
Evidence to Establish Relevance and 
Reliability Before Judges May Admit Such 
Evidence 
Although Utah Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert 
testimony, numerous cases have interpreted that rule and established the grounds for 
admissibility. Most courts have adopted the Daubert standard as explained by the United 
States Supreme Court. Utah has applied its own standard based on State v. Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), which incorporates several factors listed in Daubert . Recent 
decisions have limited Rimmasch to novel scientific evidence, while applying a general 
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reliability standard to established expert testimony. Although it is not entirely clear 
which standard applies to fingerprint evidence, under any standard, Utah courts should 
not admit this unreliable evidence. 
Expert testimony is admissible when it addresses a specialized topic, is relevant to 
the case, and is reliable: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 702. This rule is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The federal 
courts, as well as many state courts, have construed this rule in line with Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 509 U.S. 579 (19931 See Kumho Tire Co. v. 
CarmichaeL 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999). Under Daubert. courts apply a "permissive" 
approach to admitting expert testimony by weighing all relevant factors including: (1) 
empirical testing of the expert's opinion; (2) the rate of errors; (3) the standards for 
applying the principles; (4) peer review and publication of the theory; and, (5) general 
acceptance by the relevant community of experts. 509 U.S. at 589, 593-94. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has specifically declined to follow Daubert, 
that court has indicated that the Daubert factors are relevant to considering the 
admissibility of expert testimony. In State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641-42 (Utah 1996), 
the Utah Supreme Court declined to adopt Daubert and, instead, reaffirmed its pre-
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Daubert test established in State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). Under 
Rimmasch, trial courts conduct a three-part test to determine the admissibility of expert 
evidence: 
(1) whether "the scientific principles and techniques 
underlying the expert's testimony are inherently reliable," 
State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638. 641 (Utah 19961 (2) whether 
"the scientific principles or techniques at issue have been 
properly applied to the facts of the particular case by 
sufficiently qualified experts," id. (footnote omitted), and (3) 
whether the evidence is admissible under rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. See id. 
State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58,1J40, 27 P.3d 1115 (Utah 2001) (fn. omitted). 
Inherent reliability under the first prong may be established by "judicial notice if 
the scientific principles and techniques at issue have been generally recognized and 
accepted by the legal and scientific communities." Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641. If judicial 
notice is not appropriate, "the court must determine whether the party seeking to have the 
evidence admitted has sufficiently demonstrated the inherent reliability of the underlying 
principles and techniques." IdL. The key inquiry under Rimmasch is "the reliability of the 
expert's scientific testimony." Crosby. 927 P.2d at 642. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court declined to adopt Daubert. that court agreed 
that the standards under Daubert and Rimmasch "are, for the most part, similar" or the 
same. Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641. Thus, Daubert's factors are relevant to determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence 702. The main difference 
between the two approaches is that "Rimmasch provides a detailed and rigorous outline 
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for trial courts to follow" while "Daubert, on the other hand, emphasized a more flexible 
approach...." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 642. The Utah Supreme Court has extended 
Rimmasch to "technical evidence" as well as scientific evidence under Rule 702. State v. 
Butterfield. 2001 UT 59,1J29, 27 P.3d 1133. 
Despite Rimmasch's dictates, the Utah Supreme Court recently limited the reach 
of that case. In State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, [^16, 5 P.3d 642, the court ruled that "the 
Rimmasch test was not intended to apply to all expert testimony. Rather, Rimmasch is 
implicated only when the expert testimony is 'based on newly discovered principles.'" 
Id. (quoting Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396). For established techniques, Rule 702 requires 
that "the scientific principles underlying the expert's testimony be inherently reliable" 
and "'helpful to the finder of fact.'" IcL at ffi|16, 18 (quoting Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 398 
n.8). 
Following Adams, this court indicated that the law may not be clear, afterall, on 
the applicability of Rimmasch in cases involving established scientific evidence. In State 
v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, ^22 n.7, 58 P.3d 879, this court noted that "[tjhere appears 
to be some confusion as to whether the Rimmasch test is limited in application to only 
scientific or technical evidence that is based on novel principles or techniques." In 
support of this statement, this court cited a post-Adams case, State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 
TJ40, 27 P.3d 1115, in which the Utah Supreme Court stated that Rimmasch generally 
applied to "deciding whether evidence is admissible under rule 702." Schultz, 2002 UT 
15 
App 366, {^22 n.7, 58 P.3d 879. In fact, Mead applied Rimmasch to apparently 
established scientific principles concerning the cause of a person's death. Mead. 2001 
UT58,1f4l,27P.3dlll5. 
As for the appropriate standard for this case, courts have generally characterized 
fingerprint evidence as well-established rather than novel. See, e.g.. United States v. 
Plaza, 188 F. Supp.2d 549, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (Plaza II \ But, given the confusion over 
Rimmasch, it is not clear which standard applies to this appeal. Nevertheless, this appeal 
presents a unique situation because Mr. Quintana not only challenges the overall 
reliability of fingerprint evidence but also attacks the original premises underlying the 
foundation for that evidence. But, because Rimmasch requires a more "rigorous" inquiry 
than Daubert, presumably the failure to satisfy Daubert would also result in a failure to 
meet the Rimmasch test. Crosby, 27 P.2d at 642. Mr. Quintana, thus, focuses his inquiry 
on Daubert and those factors that overlap in Rimmasch. 
B. Contrary to the Premises Underlying 
Fingerprint Evidence, No Research Has Ever 
Established the Permanence and Uniqueness 
of Fingerprints 
Fingerprint evidence is inherently unreliable because the premises supporting the 
theory behind that evidence have never been established. Rather, early courts who 
concluded that fingerprinting was valid, assumed the accuracy of fingerprint evidence 
and never questioned whether fingerprints were permanent and unique to each 
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Without scientific testing, courts cannot conclude that fingerprint evidence is reliable. 
Fingerprinting involves the collection of latent or hidden print patterns that 
persons imprint, typically on hard items that they have touched. Jessica IVJ. Sombat, 
Testimony, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2819, 2825-26 (2002). Skin oil, liquids, and 
perspiration leave impressions of the ridges and pores on the hands. IcL The collection 
of latent fingerprints Iiivolves locating these impressions that may be diiiicult to see w ith 
lllii in il.nl ( w hul whin li i, ,III IK lillnll llni in «]i Ihc use ml pmnli i HI t lifmiuil' I!1 Il K: 
136. Most latent prints are distorted due to pressure, movement, or environmental 
conditions when imprinted. On average, a latent print of a finger constitutes only about 
2()c! o of the total si ii face area of the fn lgei R ober I: Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: 
' I he My th of Fingerprint "Science" is Re\ ealed ,75 S< > O tl I R < * 605. 607(2002) 
Fingerprints are matched by comparing a latent fingerprint to previously inked or 
digitally scanned fingerprints taken directly from a person's hands. Id. "An examiner 
'ridge characteristics,5 both in terms of type and location, between the latent and inked 
print under comparison." Id. (quoting Federal Bureau of Investigation, I J.S. Dept of 
Justice, I ,aw Enforcement Bulletin: A n Analysis of Standards in Fingerprint 
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judgment of the particular examiner." Id. at 636. 
The major premises underlying the ability to match fingerprints are that 
fingerprints are both permanent and unique. Sombat, 70 Fordham L. Rev. at 2827; 
United States v. Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (Plaza I) . But, neither 
of these propositions have ever been proven. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 623-26. 
Rather, the first modern-day researchers who developed fingerprint theory in the late 
1880fs simply presumed that fingerprints are permanent and unique to each individual. 
Sombat, 70 Ford. L. Rev. at 2827. 
In 1902, England became the first country to apply fingerprint evidence in a 
criminal case. Id. at 2833. In 1911, Illinois was the first jurisdiction in the United States 
to apply fingerprint evidence in People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (111. 1911). Id. The 
Jennings court asserted, without citing any data or research, that England had used 
fingerprints in "thousands of cases without error." 96 N.E. at 1081. The court also 
endorsed the four experts in the case who had matched the defendant's fingerprints based 
on their experience with fingerprinting. Id_ at 1082. It then concluded, without any 
empirical support, that fingerprint methodology was "in such general and common use 
that the courts [could] not refuse to take judicial cognizance of it." IdL 
Several courts quickly adopted Jenning's holding, again, without any analysis or 
proof that fingerprints were unique or that examiners could "reliably make an 
identification from a latent fingerprint fragment at a crime scene." Epstein, 75 So. Cal. 
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scientific evidence. Sombat, 70 Fordham L. Rev. at 2K13 These courts "appinvnlh ' 
believed that if fingerprint evidence was good enough for [] other states, then it must be 
good enough for their states as we 11 " Epstein, 75 So. Cal .1 ™ cv n* rAC\ 
I iiiis iliiiL'Ciipuriil i'videniv wit,1- idiniltnl Iwscd on (I - ; - .: assumption that 
each person has a unique set of fingerprints that cannot be confused with anoth^ 
Even modern technology has not established the uniqueness or reliability of fingerprint 
.. . - Combat. I ordham L. Rev. at 2826. In fact, the United States Department 
0 
fingerprint field have never been conducted. . . . Epstein, 75 So 624. 
Fingerprint examiners have attempted to rebut this fact by arguing that no two 
fingerprints have ever been found to be alike in the past 100 years. IdL at 626 n. 11 ° 
United. States \. J la ward, I I'7 I Supp /Ml K4X„ XS } IM I) hid MHKI'l, • illimicd on same 
grounds, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (, w . ^UvJ). Also, identical twins have been shn-\ ) 
share fingerprint patterns. Sombat, 70 Fordham L. Rev. at 2833-35. But, undermining 
tl lese statei nei its, sciei ice has also shown that "different people can share a limited 
number of ridge charact i * {. 
The argument that no one has found identical fingerprints ignores the reality that 
"no fingerprint examiner, in the course of his [or her] casework, has actually ever 
nlkMiipied In find f"iitj^ ci jn ii»ii. nl different people that match." Epstein,, 75 So C?) T 
» 
Rev. at 626 n.l 19. As the United States Supreme Court ruled in Daubert.'"Scientific 
methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can 
be falsified; indeed this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of 
human inquiry."1 509 U.S. at 593 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and 
Sufficiency of the Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent 
Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 N.W. U. L. Rev. 643, 645 (1992)). In the absence 
of any research or evidence other than assumption, the history of fingerprinting provides 
no support for its validity. Rather, fingerprint evidence is founded on still unproven 
hypotheses. 
Because fingerprint evidence has never been shown to be reliable, it "cannot, as a 
matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue' [under Rule 702]." Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 397-98 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 702). 
Thus, the State cannot meet its burden of establishing the simple helpfulness test as 
described in Adams. 2000 UT 42, ^ [18, 5 P.3d 642. If a theory is based on false or 
untested premises, that theory cannot be reliable no matter how long courts have relied 
on it. The unproven reliability of fingerprint evidence further prevents the State from 
showing that this Court should take judicial notice of the validity of fingerprint evidence. 
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 642-43 (refusing to take judicial notice of polygraph evidence). 
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C. Fingerprint Comparison is Inherently 
Unreliable Because of the Absence of Testing, 
No Established Error Rates or Standards, and 
the Subjectivity of Identifying Latent 
Fingerprints 
Ihe State also cannot meet the Rimmasch test or satisfy the factors under Daubert. 
latent fingerprints is untested, subjective, and has an unknown error rate. Ilie few 
studies that have been performed on matching latent fingerprints have yielded a high 
error rate and establish the subjective nature of identifying fingerprints. Fingerprint 
minimum standards and leaving the decision up to the individual examiner's judgment. 
The lack of testing, quality control, and objective oversight render fingerprint 
identification an unreliable ail rather than a proven discipline. 
1. No Testing Has Ever Supported 
the Validity or Reliability of 
Fingerprint Evidence 
Although the tesl Io;i admitting fingerprint e v idence ren lains i n ideal in I Jt< J t 
fn:.vrpri! \ : i . . admissible under either Rimmasch or Daubert Uecaus* Qie 
factors in Daubert are relevant to the three-part test in Rimmasch, Mr. Quintana will 
focus his discussion of those cases with the Daubert factors. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641 In 
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could not withstand Daubert's more "flexible" and "permissive" inquiry. Crosby, 27 
P.2d at 642. 
The first factor to consider under Daubert in determining reliability is whether the 
proposed theory has been tested to see if the hypotheses underlying the theory can be 
falsified or replicated. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. In addition to the absence of research 
on the uniqueness of fingerprint evidence, no testing has established that fingerprint 
examiners can reliably match latent fingerprints to a suspect's complete fingerprint 
profile. As discussed above, the only way to match a latent fingerprint is to manually 
compare the recovered latent print to a full set of fingerprints. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. 
Rev. at 607. Examiners then look for similar ridge characteristics and make a subjective 
judgment that the latent fingerprint matches. IcL at 636. 
The reliability of matching fingerprints is even more complicated when using 
latent fingerprints. As indicated above, latent prints on average include only about 20% 
of the surface area of a full fingerprint. IcL at 607. Latent prints are also susceptible to 
pressure, distortion, or smudges. IdL at 609-10; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint 
Evidence In An Age of DNA Profiling. 67 Brook. L. Rev. 13, 26 (2001). The shape of 
the surface where the latent print is deposited can also distort fingerprints. Epstein, 75 
So. Cal. L. Rev. at 610. Latent prints can further be disfigured when lifting the prints. 
Id. No studies have been conducted to determine the degree that distortion affects 
identifying fingerprints. LI 
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"I he few s'::r!i'.* that ha\ e beei 1 attempted on examiners' reliability 
fingerprints have produced disappointing results. The only published stud) on 
fingerprint identification produced vastly varying responses. Researchers sent ten pairs 
of latent and inked fingerprints to fingerprint examiners in England and W ales with ten 
23 (citing Ian W. Evett & R.L. Williams, A Review of Sixteen Point Fingerprint 
Standard in England and Wales, 46 J Forensic Identification 49 (1996)). By 
comparison, the SI .CI I) requires oim iU matching points. R 1 1 8: 15 7 Six of the pairs 
different fingers. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Re\. at 622. The researchers asked participants 
to determine whether the pairs were identifiable and, if so, how many points matched. 
Id at 622-23. 
number of matching points ranged from 10 to 40 on one pair to 14 to 56 on another pair. 
Id. As for finding a match, 44% of the participants found a match of one pair while 56% 
subjective nature of points of comparison'" and thatfK experts \ ary w idely in the ir 
judgments of individual points."1 Id. (quoting Evett & Williams, J. Forensic 
Identification at 61, 65). I hese results are particularly troubling for jurisdictions in the 
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comparison or, more frequently, no minimum number of points, at all. Id. n.105. 
The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has reached similarly inconclusive results 
in its efforts to document the reliability of fingerprint identification. In United States v. 
Mitchell, No. 96-407-1 (E. D. Pa. 2000), the DOJ claimed that two latent fingerprints 
matched the defendant's left and right thumbs. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 628. The 
DOJ sent the latent prints along with the defendant's full ten-print card to 53 law 
enforcement agencies. IcL at 628-29. Of the 39 agencies that responded, 30 correctly 
identified both prints, four could only identify one of the prints, while five failed to 
identify either of the prints. Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (correcting results that 
Epstein decribed). Thus, 23% of the agencies could not match both prints. 
The DOJ has conceded the lack of research supporting the reliability of 
identifying fingerprints. In March of 2000, the DOJ's research branch, the National 
Institute of Justice ("NIJ") sent out a formal "Solicitation" to DOJ fingerprint examiners 
requesting research on the validity of fingerprint evidence. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. 
at 624-25. The purpose for this request was to establish statistical bases for the 
uniqueness of fingerprints and the reliability of examiners' identifications. Id. at 625. In 
making this request, the DOJ admitted that no empirical evidence supports fingerprint 
theory or the reliability of fingerprint identification. Id. at 625-27. 
In sum, no evidence supports that fingerprint examiners can reliably identify 
fingerprints. In fact, the existing evidence shows a great deal of variation in examiners' 
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case, the police rely on latent fingerprints that may be distorted and include only a 
fraction of a full fingerprint. 
2. ' 1 he Absence of Error Rates, 
When Errors Are Known to 
Occur, Seriously Undercuts the 
Val idity of Fingerprint 
Identification 
The second reliability factor, known error rates, further prevents the State from 
fingerprint evidence is that the fingerprint community contends that fingerprints offer 
"incontestable proof of identity" with no-known en or ik\ Mnookin, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 
at 2?. \s shown above. *;t^ conclusu . ;> oased on assumption rather than any 
x
 . . Mlcnlly false since the 
final matching decision is a subjective judgment of the examiner and cases have been 
reported in court decisions and the press where misidentifications have occurred, TcL 
Even in this case, the defense presented evidence that a \wu *. .a\ ^ \\\ police examiner 
misidentified the defendant's fingerprints as the \ • ictin i' s R 1 78: 16' 5 ' " \ ii) • hi n :i lan 
process is capable of errors" ranging from clerical mistakes to outright fraud. Mnookin, 
67 Brook. L. Rev. at 50. 
analysis. Rather than stating an opinion that fingerprints match, "latent print examiners 
make the claim of'absolute certainty5 for their identifications" and do not account for 
even the possibility of human error. Epstein. 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 612. The mere 
notion that a field of study is absolutely infallible defies common sense and is so absurd 
that this claim in itself should raise concerns about the validity of fingerprint evidence. 
Mnookin, 67 Brook. L. Rev. at 35. Even DNA identifications are made in terms of 
probabilities based on extensive scientific research rather than based on absolute 
correctness. Id at 49-50; United States v. Crisp. 324 F.3d 261, 278 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(Michael, J., dissenting). Fingerprint examiners' approach appears to be based more on 
zeal rather than reality. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 645. 
The fingerprint community's own proficiency testing supports a significant error 
rate. In 1995, the IAI tested 156 fingerprint examiners to accredit them. Epstein, 75 So. 
Cal. L. Rev. at 633-34. Only 44% of the examiners correctly identified the five latent 
prints that matched a ten-print card and the two latent prints that did not match. IcL_ at 
634. Twenty-two percent of participants misidentified non-matching prints. IcL_ 
Although the DOJ has conducted proficiency tests on its examiners, its tests do 
not even approach real world conditions. For the years 1995 to 2001, the DOJ conducted 
447 tests and found only four errors. Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 555-56. As a federal 
district court judge recently ruled, experts have concluded that the DOJ proficiency tests 
were unrepresentative of the quality of latent prints found at typical crimes scenes, the 
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Id. at 556-59. The DOJ proficiency tests provide no information on error rate s Ii i. at i/y 
event, the State presented no evidence of SLCPD's testing or proficiency rates. 
Some courts have argued that adversarial testing of fingerprints in the courtroom 
854. Ihis position lacks merit since no one has ever attempted to scientifically test the 
validity of fingerprint evidence. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 651 In any event, 
adversarial testing is no substitute for the rigors of scientific research. Id There i~ 
simpl> i i "rice that fingerprint iciei ltificatioi I has a si if: 
justify its admission as expert testimony. 
3. The Absence of Standards For 
Identi fying Fingerprints 
Constitutes a Subjective Process 
Which is Fraught With Error 
and Potential For Abuse. 
The third reliability factor assesses the standards for applying the technique's 
operation. Daubert 506 I J .S at 594 No single standard exists for identifying 
apply in matching fingerprints. Identification is left to the personal judgment and whim 
of the examiner. The lack of standards results in a subjective determination without any 
method of validating the identification. 
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"Latent fingerprint examiners in the United States currently operate in the absence 
of any uniform objective standards." Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 636. The minimum 
number of points of comparison differ from agency to agency and the fingerprint 
community cannot agree on whether to even require a minimum showing. Id. at 610-11, 
636. "[Fingerprint examiners are not even in agreement as to what it is they are looking 
for when comparing fingerprints. Examiners hold widely varying beliefs as to the 
number, nomenclature, and frequency of the standard ridge characteristics." IdL at 638-
39. In fact, both the DO J and authorities in Great Britain have concluded that no 
minimum requirements are needed at all. Id at 611, Plaza II. 188 F. Supp. 2d at 570. 
"The lack of objective standards means that determining a match is necessarily 
subjective; it is based on the personal judgment of the examiner rather than 
intersubjective criteria that remain the same from print to print and from examiner to 
examiner." Mnookin, 67 Brook. L. Rev. at 58. 
Further, the fingerprint community has established no minimum qualifications for 
examiners. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 642. They are not required to be educated, 
pass any certification test, or even be licensed. IdL No training is required, but, rather, 
examiners conduct apprenticeships "most often expressed in terms of duration, not in 
specific goals and objectives, and often end with a subjective assessment that the trainee 
is ready." Id In this case, for example, Officer Kido, has earned no college degrees in 
science or forensics, but, instead, has participated in several fingerprint training courses. 
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Kido's training qualifies her to identify fingerprints reliably. 
The State also failed to show that SLCPD's standards are adequate. Officer Kido 
testified that SI .CPD' s crime lab requires 10 points of comparison and that she located 
whether Officer Kido properly identified the latent print because the identification 
process is subjective, there is no accreditation process, and different examiners may view 
ridge characteristics differently. Epstein, o Su * .u Kc . . i iM.\ In essence, the 
State asked tl le trial • ::c 1 it It 1:> sic • \ - tc • tt i ist it ai: id be l ieve that t ) ci ii ne lab 1 :t.as 
properly trained Officer Kido. This lack of standards provides no assurance that the 
latent print in this case matches Mr. Quintana. 
iiv. i,u i standards also creates the risk that examiners will fudge on their 
' i : : •* iard that appears to appl> to tl le fingerpi iiit c on n ill initj - is 
the one dissimilarity iuiw. Specifically, if an examiner finds one dissimilarity between a 
latent and inked fingerprint, no identification can be made. Mnookin, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 
at 59 But, because identifying fingerprints is subjective, examiners may be "tempted to 
temptation appears to occur with some frequency especially when the examiner 
concludes that several point of comparison match. Epstein, 75 So. Cal I Rev, at 640-
1 1. I he lack c i training and standai (Is 1 las i lot only resi iltecl In unqualified examiners but 
also opens up itself to dishonesty. IcL at 643. 
4. The Total Lack of Critical Peer 
Review and Publication Further 
Undermine the Reliability of 
Fingerprint Evidence. 
The fourth reliability factor requires peer review and published critique of the 
technique. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. The only peer review conducted in the past 100 
years has been fingerprint examiners explaining their techniques to each other and 
touting the reliability of fingerprint evidence in self-serving journals. Just as with 
research, no serious critique of fingerprint evidence has ever been conducted. Further, 
despite examiners' claims, the practice of one examiner verifying another's work serves 
as no replacement for peer review and critical evaluation. 
Peer review means testing the theory "followed by publication and then 
replication by other scientists." Paul C. Giannelli, Fingerprints Challenged!, 17 Crim. 
Just. 33, 34 (2002). For peer review to be legitimate, it must be done by "'a competitive, 
unbiased community of practitioners and academics5" who would challenge the validity 
of the theory. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 645 (quoting United States v. Starzecpvzel, 
880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding expert testimony on handwriting 
analysis unreliable)). But, in today's fingerprint community, the literature is mostly self-
promoting and does not challenge "the fundamental premises that underlie latent print 
identification or how such comparisons should be conducted." IdL_ at 644. 
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examiner identifies a latent fingerprint, another examiner usually > i: i n ist \ erif> the initial 
identification. Epstein, 75 So. Cal 1 \<\j\, at 641. This form of "peer review1' does not 
even approach the kind of scrutiny that occurs when theories are critically and 
sciei itifically teste d lit I tl le first 'place , the \ erifying exai nine i: lacks in lpai tiality. 
Presumably, when an examiner seeks verification from a peer, the peer will k iio"\ v that an 
initial identification has already occurred. Plaza L 179 F. Supp. 2d at 505 & n.15. 
Further, examiners working in the same lab will likely have learned their techniques from 
performed by the initial examiner will likely be repeated by the verifying technician. 
Verification by a biased examiner from the same lab merely perpetuates the myth that 
fingerprint identification ; > i u i a \ n i> • c. 
5. The General Acceptance of 
Fingerprint Evidence Provides 
No Support for Its Admission 
When That Evidence Is Based on 
Faulty Premises and No Testing 
generally accepted by the fingerprint community and courts for almost 100 years. But, as 
detailed above, the tradition of admitting fingerprint evidence is based on faulty 
assi imptions and unpi o\ en techniques. ' long use of fingerprint evidence only shows 
that courts have relied on the false premises underlying fingerprint theory for 100 years. 
Although no court has upheld a recent challenge to fingerprint evidence, the reasoning of 
those courts rely on the circular argument that fingerprint evidence is admissible because 
it has been admitted for so many years. This reasoning reflects the same false hope of 
finding conclusive evidence of guilt that originally led courts to adopt fingerprint theory. 
In the last few years, several courts have rejected challenges to fingerprint 
evidence based on the same false reasoning that fingerprint evidence was accepted long 
ago. Most of these courts have relied on the reasoning of United States v. Haward . 117 
F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), affirmed on same grounds . 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 
2001). See United States v. Crisp. 324 F.3d 261, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Sutton. 337 F.3d 792, 798 n.4 (7 th Cir. 2003); United States v. Collins. 340 F.3d 672, 
682-83 (8th Cir. 2003); State v. Cole. 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 308; State v. Pavne. 2003 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4414; Moore v. State. 78 S.W.3d 387, 391 n.l (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); 
Sombat, 70 Fordham L. Rev. at 2861. 
The federal district court judge in Haward reasoned that fingerprint evidence has 
been generally accepted for the past 100 "with the highest stakes possible - liberty and 
sometimes life." 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854. The judge added that, despite the serious 
implications of identifying fingerprints, no one had ever "come across a case in which 
two different fingers had identical fingerprints...." IdL Claiming that the defense had 
presented no known error rates, fingerprint evidence "has been subject to adversarial 
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ruled that fingerprint ev idence had controll ing standards and that it had proven to be 
reliable. IdL. A l though the judge conceded that examiners make identification e r rors , h e 
found adequate the abi l i ty of defendants to cross-examine fingerprint experts o r t o obtain 
the ii • :)vv i 1 expei t to giv e a contrai > opii lioi i Id 
Haward's reasoning centers on the general acceptance of fingerprint evidence for 
the past several decades. "But this argument is circular: it says that we know the 
technique is reliable because we have long used and trusted it Mnookin, 67 Brook, I . 
sole standard of admission which was rejected in Phillips v. Jackson , 615 P.2d 1228, 
1234 (Utah 1980) over 20 years ago. Crosby. 927 P.2d at 640; Crisp, 324 F.3d at 272 
(Michael, J. dissenting). 
I lav v ard also ignc re s tt le fact tl: lat fingerprints ha\ e i ite < > ei beei l pro''\ en to b 3 
unique or that examiners can reliably identify them. In fact, the judge in Haward faulted 
the defense for not producing evidence to undermine the reliability of fingerprint 
evidence. 11 / I Supp 2d at 85 1 I he judge confused the burden of production; the 
propon v,u;;. 
42, ^|18, 5 P.3d 642. As one prominent forensic treatise has concluded, "Haward 
represents 'an excellent, albeit deeply troubling, example of a court straining scientific 
2861 (quoting David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and 
Science of Expert Testimony §1-3.5 (2002)); see also Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 646 
(discussing scholarly criticism of Havvard). 
Haward also fails to recognize that general acceptance does not establish 
reliability "where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories 
grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy." 
Kumho Tire Co. v. CarmichaeL 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). A contemporary example to 
fingerprint evidence of baseless "science" is anthropometry also called the Bertillon 
method of identification. Sombat, 70 Ford. L. Rev. at 2833. Under this method, in the 
early 1900's, forensic examiners believed that criminals could be identified simply by 
measuring their body structure. Id Although anthropometry was completely discredited, 
fingerprint evidence survived even though the theory behind it was never established. 
The test of time only supports reliability when the original assumptions supporting a 
technique are reliable. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151. 
Moreover, general acceptance only supports validity if the "relevant scientific 
community" recognizes the technique. State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 29, TJ32, 27 P.3d 
1133. But, "in defining a relevant scientific community, it is necessary to look beyond 
the practioners of the technique that is under assessment." Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 
646. Were this Court only to consider the fingerprint community's obviously biased 
view that fingerprints are certain, this Court would ignore the undisputed facts that 
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fingerprint evidence has never been proven to be valid or reliable. Rather, such a 
decision would harken back to Jennings, when fingerprint evidence was first admitted in 
this country. According to that case, fingerprint methodology was admissible simply 
because it was "in such general and common use that the courts [could] not refuse to take 
judicial cognizance of it." People v. Jennings. 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (111. 1911). 
Relying on the history of use of fingerprint evidence also ignores the reality that 
"virtually everyone, including most of the defense bar, simply assumed the reliability of 
the evidence." Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 648. Only recently have defense attorneys 
begun to question the assumptions underlying fingerprint evidence. 
6. Prosecutors and the Courts Have 
Provided No Other Reasons 
Supporting the Reliability of 
Fingerprint Evidence. 
The other courts that have recently admitted fingerprint evidence provide no valid 
reasons for admitting such evidence in this case. Ha ward 's remaining arguments are 
unconvincing. Further, although one court ruled that the DOJ could reliably identify 
fingerprints, the State has not established the reliability of the fingerprint identification in 
this case. The only apparent reason supporting the admission of fingerprint evidence is 
the sheer hope that science can be used to prove guilt. 
Havvard's additional arguments are unpersuasive because it is generally fruitless 
to challenge fingerprint evidence on cross-examination or through expert testimony. 
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First, mounting a challenge assumes that defense attorneys have the resources or the 
knowledge to contest fingerprint evidence. Often, defense attorneys and their clients 
have few resources to hire experts. Epstein, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 648. In any event, an 
expert may be of little help since all fingerprint examiners have generally received the 
same or similar deficient training and the lack of standards in the profession limits 
experts' ability to contest fingerprint evidence. Id. at 648-49. 
Second, given the commonly held assumptions about fingerprint evidence, 
attorneys may conclude that challenging fingerprint evidence would be futile. Attorneys 
themselves may believe that fingerprint evidence is bullet-proof. I(L at 605 n.3. Even if 
attorneys are familiar with recent challenges to fingerprint evidence, they could 
reasonably believe that jurors would not be persuaded. In a study conducted in 1987, 
before the advent of DNA testing, 93% of jurors believed that fingerprint evidence was a 
science while 85% believed that fingerprints were the most reliable form of 
identification. Id. Thus, even if the defense could challenge the validity of fingerprint 
evidence, it would be faced with the insurmountable task of changing jurors fixed 
beliefs. 
Third, Havvard's argument that the defense can find its own expert provides no 
support for admitting expert evidence. If the standard for admission was that the defense 
can present contrary testimony, "then virtually any expert could gain admittance, even 
astrologers and psychics." Id. at 649. The key to the admission of expert testimony is 
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reliability, not whether the defense can present an opposing viewpoint. Crosby, 927 P.2d 
at 642. Because fingerprint evidence has never been shown to be reliable, that evidence 
is not admissible under Daubert Rimmasch, or any other test under Rule of Evidence 
702. Id 
One other prominent decision has supported the admission of fingerprints 
testimony but provides no support for admitting the fingerprint evidence in this case. In 
Plaza L a judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania caused a great stir when he 
adopted most of the arguments above and concluded that because fingerprint testimony 
was a subjective opinion the government's expert would not be allowed to testify about 
the identification process and the defendant could present his own expert testimony. 179 
F. Supp. 2d at 516. The government then requested the judge to reconsider his decision. 
Plaza IL 188 F. Supp. 2d at 551. 
On reconsideration, the judge ruled that he had "changed my mind" and decided to 
allow the government's expert to give an opinion on identification. Id_ at 576. In doing 
so, the judge reiterated his concerns about the absence of testing, error rates, or standards 
for identifying fingerprints; the inadequacy of one examiner verifying another's 
conclusions; and the DOJ's easy proficiency testing of its examiners. Id. at 555-66 & 
n.2. He also noted the study in the Mitchell case in which the DO J sent fingerprints to 
numerous state agencies for identification. Id. at 560. Four of 39 state examiners could 
only identify one of two latent prints while five more failed to identify either of the 
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latents. Id. 
Nevertheless, the judge concluded that the DOJ had established that its examiners 
could reliably identify latent fingerprints. 14. at 566. Specifically, the DOJ requires its 
recruits to complete a four-year degree, preferably in physical science, conducts a two-
year training program on fingerprints, and certifies its examiners with a three-day 
examination. Id The judge also noted that the defense had presented no evidence that 
the DOJ had an unreliable error rate. IdL at 566, 573. He then ruled that the absence of 
standards was acceptable because the DOJ applied its own standards and there was an 
emerging consensus that subjective determinations were allowed in the fingerprint 
community. Id at 566-571. While not commenting on other agencies, the judge ruled 
that the DOJ examiners could give their opinions on identification. Id. 
Thus, the ruling in Plaza II is limited to DOJ examiners and specifically does not 
apply to other agencies. In particular, that case does not resolve whether the SLCPD 
reliably identifies latent fingerprints. Officer Kido offered no testimony on whether 
SLCPD's crime lab compares favorably to the DOJ. 
Mr. Quintana cannot be faulted for any lack of evidence because the proponent of 
evidence has the burden of proving reliability. Adams. 2000 UT 42, Tfl8, 5 P.3d 642. If 
the evidence is lacking, the State has failed to show that the SLCPD reliably identifies 
latent fingerprints. Thus, Plaza IPs blaming of the defense for not establishing an error 
rate is misguided and erroneously shifted the burden to the defendant. 
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Plaza II further lacks persuasive value because it, like Haward, and its progeny, 
heavily rely on the history of admitting fingerprint evidence. In reaching his conclusion, 
the Plaza II judge extensively cited Great Britain's long experience and testing with 
fingerprints and noted that the United States' original application of that evidence relied 
upon Americans' experiences with British fingerprint examiners just after the turn of the 
20th century. Id. at 566-75. Like in the Haward line of cases, the Plaza II judge failed to 
appreciate that fingerprinting has never been proven as valid or accurate and that its 
original premises remain unproven. Instead, he simply took judicial notice that 
"fingerprints are unique and permanent." 188 F. Supp. 2d at 560. Without testing these 
assumptions, Plaza II offers no support for admitting the fingerprints in this case. 
Contrary to the incomplete reasoning of these cases, the dissenting judge in 
United States v.Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272-78 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J. dissenting), 
recently authored a thoughtful, thorough discussion of fingerprint evidence that adopts 
the arguments detailed in this brief. That judge concluded that the lack of testing, known 
error rates, and standards, coupled with the inherently subjective quality of fingerprint 
identification renders fingerprint evidence unreliable. Id. He described the decisions 
that have admitted fingerprint evidence as mainly relying on fingerprinting's long but 
unproven history. IcL at 276-77. According to this well-reasoned opinion, such an 
approach is simply a return to the general acceptance standard of admission that was 
discarded long ago. Id. at 272. 
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Courts' continued clinging to fingerprint evidence reflects an anachronistic view 
of science. In the early 20th century, ,f[l]egal writers hoped that science, with its 
privileged access to the natural world, could provide certainty and objectivity." 
Mnookin, 67 Brook. L. Rev. at 36. This hope was realized when fingerprint evidence 
appeared to be the "holy grail [of] evidence that could simultaneously be definite and 
dispositive, a way to find the truth beneath the contradictions of witnesses." IdL After 
almost 100 years of fulfilling this hope, fingerprint evidence has now gained such 
extreme "cultural authority" that courts appear to be reluctant to question it. Id. 
D. The Erroneous Admission of the Fingerprint 
Evidence Harmed the Defense Because the 
Fingerprint Was the Only Evidence Presented 
Connecting Mr. Ouintana to the Crime. 
Mr. Quintana requests this court to reverse his conviction because the only 
evidence even remotely tying him to the burglary was the fingerprint found on Mr. 
Cannon's box. This Court will reverse a conviction when an error creates a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury's verdict would have been different without the error. State v. 
Vail, 2002 UT App 176,1[17, 51 P.3d 1285. As explained more fully in section II of the 
Argument, this case was entirely circumstantial. The only tie Mr. Quintana had to the 
burglary was the fingerprint. Removing that vital piece of evidence eliminated any 
connection to the crime. Thus, the erroneous admission of the fingerprint was 
dispositive in this case. 
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II. THE LATENT FINGERPRINT, WHICH CONSTITUTED 
THE ONLY EVIDENCE TYING MR. QUINTANA TO 
THE CRIME, WAS INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
Even if the fingerprint evidence was admissible, the State presented insufficient 
circumstantial evidence to convict Mr. Quintana of burglary and theft. Although 
circumstantial evidence may support a conviction, the only evidence presented here was 
a latent fingerprint. Because there was no evidence of when that fingerprint was placed 
or that Mr. Quintana stole or possessed any of the missing items, the State failed to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When, as here, a conviction is based on only remote or 
speculative possibilities, reversal is required. 
In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court affords great deference to 
the jury verdict. State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). It will only 
reverse a conviction when reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime. Id. But, this standard is altered when the State 
rests its case entirely on circumstantial evidence. In such a case, the State must prove 
each element of the offense and that the circumstantial evidence provides a logical basis 
for finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt: 
When a conviction is based solely on circumstantial 
evidence, we review the evidence to determine: 
"(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every 
element of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences 
that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and 
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reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty 
verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that 
give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." 
State v. Lvman. 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Brown . 948 
P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997), and State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)). 
This case centered on one piece of circumstantial evidence: the fingerprint on Mr. 
Cannon's box. Without the fingerprint, the State presented no other evidence that Mr. 
Quintana was connected, in any way, with the burglary and theft. Thus, the question 
raised in this appeal is whether the jury could have found each element of burglary and 
theft beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on the fingerprint. 
The evidence was lacking because the State could not show when the fingerprint 
was placed on the box or that Mr. Quintana took any of the stolen property. The burglary 
took place on October 20, 2002, between 12:45 p.m. and 2:15 p.m. R. 178: 78-79. 
There was no evidence, however, that the fingerprint was placed on the box during that 
period. Although Ms. Cannon testified that the box remained in a chest of drawers for 
30 years, that testimony completely failed to address when the fingerprint was placed. R. 
178: 96. Given this wide time span, the State can only speculate that Mr. Quintana 
touched the box during the hour and a half when the burglary occurred (assuming that 
fingerprint evidence is reliable). Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281. And, as explained above, the 
police may have misidentified the smudged, latent fingerprint. 
The evidence did not implicate Mr. Quintana in any other way. No one saw Mr. 
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Quintana near the scene of the crime, the police recovered none of the jewelry or money 
taken, nor did anyone know of Mr. Quintana having any connection with the Cannons' 
home. Thus, the evidence failed to support the burglary or theft convictions. 
This case is similar to State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), 
in which the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction for aggravated robbery because 
the circumstantial evidence did not place the defendant at scene of the robbery. The 
evidence showed that the defendant accompanied a man who took a car from a used car 
lot for a test drive. Id, The defendant and the driver had the car for several hours, after 
which the defendant returned the car within minutes after the car had been used in a 
robbery. IcL When contacted by the police, the defendant admitted using the car and 
falsely claimed that he had taken his companion to the hospital. Id_ The State presented 
no other evidence to implicate the defendant in the robbery. IJL The supreme court ruled 
that "the circumstantial evidence connecting [defendant] to [the driver] and the crime is 
insufficient to prove" that the defendant was involved in the robbery. I&_ 
As in KaHsz, the State merely presented circumstantial evidence that Mr. Quintana 
had touched the box. But, the State did not show that Mr. Quintana touched the box at_ 
the time of the burglary. Like the defendant in Kalisz, Mr. Quintana possessed none of 
the stolen property and had no other connection to the crime. If anything, this case 
presents a stronger case for innocence because Mr. Quintana did not lie to police or 
otherwise try to mislead them as did the defendant in Kalisz. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that it is difficult to establish proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt when a case is based solely on a single latent fingerprint. In State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 237-38 (Utah 1991), that court ruled that fingerprint evidence 
should be treated like any other circumstantial evidence and was not entitled to any 
special treatment. After reaching this conclusion, the majority commented on Justice 
Stewart's concurrence that "an instruction on fingerprint evidence . . . may well be 
appropriate, or even mandatory, where there is no other significant evidence pertaining to 
identity." Id at 241 (Stewart, J, concurring). The majority noted that its holding did not 
"imply that it is error for the trial court to give a cautionary instruction about fingerprint 
evidence, or any other type of evidence, where the prosecution's case is entirely 
circumstantial." Id. at 238 n.3. 
Although Hamilton indicates that a conviction may be based solely on a 
fingerprint, that case also signals that proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be difficult 
to prove under such circumstances. When, as here, the State cannot show with any 
degree of certainty when a fingerprint was placed on a box that had remained in one 
place for over 30 years, "'the inferences that can be drawn from th[e] evidence have [no] 
basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove'" the defendant's 
guilt. Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281 (quoting Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 and Workman. 852 P.2d 
at 985). Rather, the evidence supports "'only remote or speculative possibilities of 
guilt'" and the conviction must be reversed. IcL 
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III. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE 
DEFENSE THEORY OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS, THE 
TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THAT LESSER OFFENSE. 
Despite the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. Defendants are entitled to 
instruct the jury on lesser included offenses when even slight evidence support's the 
defendant's theory. Here, the evidence provided no indication when the fingerprint was 
placed on the box. The evidence, thus, was consistent with a separate criminal trespass. 
To instruct the jury on lesser offenses, criminal defendants need only present a 
minimal quantum of evidence to support the lesser charge. Freely instructing juries on 
lesser offenses at the defendant's request avoids placing the jury in the all-or-nothing 
dilemma of choosing between acquittal and convicting of a more serious offense than the 
defendant deserves. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983). This approach 
"serves a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty of any 
offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the 
prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal." State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 
1986). To avoid such unfair situations, trial judges should "liberally construe[]" 
defendants' requests for lesser included offense instructions. Id.; see also State v. 
Carruth, 1999 UT 107, 993 P.2d 869 (reaffirming principles discussed above). 
The trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury below on criminal trespass. 
Criminal defendants are entitled to instruct the jury on their theory of the case, including 
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"iesser offenses if any reasonable view of the evidence would support5" conviction for 
the lesser offense. Carruth. 1999 UT 107, ^ [6, 993 P.2d 869 (quoting State v. Gillian . 
463 P.2d 811,812 (Utah 1970)). Thus, "when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore 
susceptible to alternative interpretations," trial judges must give lesser offense 
instructions. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. Even "slight" evidence is sufficient to require a 
jury instruction. State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Utah 1980). In determining 
whether a rational basis exists, trial courts "must 'view the evidence and the inferences 
that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the defense.5" State v. Kruger, 
2000UT60,Tfl4,6P.3dlll6. 
The lesser included offense instruction was required in this case, first of all, 
because trespass is a lesser included offense of burglary. Baker, 671 P.2d at 154-60. 
Second, because the State presented no evidence of when the fingerprint was placed on 
the box, the evidence supported the reasonable inference that Mr. Quintana had entered 
the Cannons' home at a different time than when the robbery occurred. R. 178: 178. As 
detailed above, there was no evidence that Mr. Quintana entered the home while the 
Cannons were at church. In fact, the fingerprint could have been placed on the box at 
any time during the 30 years it sat in the chest of drawers. Moreover, the presence of 
other smudged fingerprints supported the possibility that another person could have 
ransacked the house. 
A criminal trespass occurs when a person "enters or remains unlawfully on 
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property" and intends either to "cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to 
any property" or "intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-206 (1999). Mr. Quintana's theory that he could have entered the home on 
a separate occasion and touched the box fits within this definition of intending to annoy 
or injure property without intending to commit theft or a felony. There was no evidence 
that Mr. Quintana possessed any of the stolen goods or touched the box with intent to 
steal its contents. Rather, the evidence only shows that Mr. Quintana touched the box at 
some unspecified time for an unspecified purpose. Mr. Quintana could have even 
touched the box over 30 years ago before the Cannons obtained it. Because this evidence 
was "ambiguous and [] susceptible to alternative interpretations," the trial judge was 
obligated to instruct the jury on criminal trespass. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. 
The trial judge appears to have misunderstood the law on instructing jurors on 
lesser included offenses. Instead of viewing the evidence most favorable to the defense, 
the trial judge stated that the defense was asking the court to "look at the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State...." R. 178: 178. This view of the evidence appears to 
have affected the judge's view of the strength of the defense theory. After, viewing the 
evidence favorable to the State, the judge conceded that the it was "remotely possible" 
that the jury could believe Mr. Quintana's alternative theory of the case. The judge, 
nevertheless, refused to instruct the jury on criminal trespass because he regarded this 
theory as too "remote." IdL Utah law plainly provides that defendants are entitled to a 
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lesser included offense instruction even when the evidence supporting the lesser crime is 
"slight.11 Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1232. Here, even though the trial judge appeared to 
concede that the evidence provided slight evidence of Mr. Quintana's theory, he 
erroneously refused to instruct the jury on that theory. 
The trial judge's erred also prejudiced Mr. Quintana's defense. This Court 
recently concluded that it presumes harm when trial judges fail to instruct juries on the 
defendant's theory of the case: 
We conclude that when an element of the crime . . . is in 
dispute, and the evidence is consistent with both the defendant's 
and the State's theory of the case, failing to instruct on the lesser 
included offense presumptively affects the outcome of the trial. 
Under such circumstances, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined, because the available evidence could support a 
jury's decision to convict on either the greater or lesser crime. 
State v. Knight, 2003 UT App 354, ^|17, P.3d . Because the trial judge erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on criminal trespass, this Court should reverse the burglary 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Quintana requests this Court to reverse his convictions for burglary and theft 
because the trial judge admitted unreliable fingerprint evidence and that evidence served 
as the only evidence of guilt. In any event, reversal is required because the State failed 
to present sufficient evidence of guilt. At the very least, this Court should grant Mr. 
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Quintana a new trial because the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the 
lesser offense of criminal trespass. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
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